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Among the wider political and social
forces that influence the Pacific
Islands, none mattered more in 1999
than globalization, and in particular
the globalization agenda now
embraced by regional organizations
such as the South Pacific Forum. If
globalization is the ever-increasing
integration of economies across terri-
torial borders, then the globalization
agenda is the set of economic policies
that effect such integration. Among
these are free trade, privatization,
public service reform and harmoniza-
tion by different governments of their
customs procedures, product stan-
dards, trade regulations, and laws
relating to investment, communica-
tions and the enforcement of property
rights. In the last few years the South
Pacific Forum has endorsed, advo-
cated, and disseminated the globaliza-
tion agenda in the region; meetings of
Forum economic and trade ministers
have overshadowed that of the Forum
itself, and the Forum has defined key
issues of concern to the region as
mostly economic. 
It was hardly a surprise, then, that
the Forum Trade Ministers Meeting in
Suva in July made the most important
regional decision of the year when it
endorsed a Forum Island Countries
Free Trade Area to be phased in dur-
ing the first decade of the new cen-
tury. By the time regional leaders met
for the thirtieth South Pacific Forum
in Palau in October and themselves
endorsed the proposal, the Forum
Secretariat had refined it so that free
trade would be implemented in stages.
Developing Forum island states would
commit themselves to free trade by
2009 while smaller island states and
least developed countries in the region
would reach the goal by 2011. Forum
leaders will consider a detailed draft
agreement on free trade at their meet-
ing in 2000.
The significance of the free trade
decision does not lie primarily in the
fact that Forum island countries will
be trading freely among themselves by
2011. After all, those countries trade
far more with the rest of the world
than with each other.
The decision is rather meant to
reassure aid agencies, foreign inves-
tors, and  international institutions—
above all the World Trade Organiza-
tion (wto)—that the region is serious
about the globalization agenda. As
Secretary-General of the Forum Secre-
tariat Noel Levi told a meeting on
Post Lomé Trade Arrangements in
July, the plan for a free trade area
“signals our region’s willingness to
consider new measures for dealing
with globalisation and trade liberali-
sation, through regional integration.”
Levi emphasized the importance of
the World Trade Organization:
The wto has emerged as the most
important international Forum for nego-
tiation of trade, commercial and general
economic policies. The new rules and
disciplines that have emerged through
successive rounds of negotiations are
touching upon the economic and trade
relations of countries that are not even
wto members. Some developing coun-
tries like the Forum Island Countries
have had little say in the creation of
these rules. In recognition of this chang-
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ing global environment Forum Trade
Ministers yesterday endorsed in princi-
ple an FTA [Free Trade Agreement]
amongst Forum Island Countries (pir
1999a).
Following the Forum’s free trade deci-
sion, the World Trade Organization
funded a week-long seminar on trade
negotiations for officials from the
Cook Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua
New Guinea, New Zealand, Sämoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
The Forum also undertook to estab-
lish a Forum delegation in Geneva for
the specific purpose of keeping abreast
of developments in the World Trade
Organization.
The Forum’s move to free trade is
linked to longer-term prospects for
integrating the South Pacific into other
free trade areas. In time the FIC Free
Trade Area is almost certain to be
combined with the Australia–New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations
arrangements that have already made
trade almost free across the Tasman
Sea. The FIC Free Trade Area will
then be a Forum Free Trade Area,
with island countries imposing no tar-
iffs on imports from Australia and
New Zealand. Tariffs will diminish as
a source of government revenue for a
number of island governments, com-
pelling them either to curtail their
spending or seek revenue elsewhere.
The second prospect is that the FIC
Free Trade Area will become the basis
for a Regional Economic Partnership
Agreement (repa) with the European
Union (EU), which has proposed such
agreements as part of the framework
of arrangements that will succeed the
Lomé Convention in Europe’s trade
with the African, Caribbean, and
Pacific (acp) group of states. The eight
Pacific acp members are Fiji, Kiribati,
Papua New Guinea, Sämoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
For all intents and purposes, a
Regional Economic Partnership
Agreement between Europe and these
countries—and almost certainly with
other Pacific Island countries as well
—would be a free trade area. Again,
the driving force behind the concept 
is the need to bring Europe’s trading
arrangements into conformity with
the requirements of the World Trade
Organization.
For years the World Trade Organi-
zation seemed to most people to be an
uncontroversial organization engaged
in the largely technical business of lib-
eralizing global trade. But concern has
grown in recent years about its global
reach, its undemocratic character, and
the impact of its globalizing program
on developing countries. The key
issue for critics of the World Trade
Organization in the Pacific Islands has
been the Lomé Convention, which for
the last quarter century has provided
Pacific acp countries with both aid
and preferential access to the Euro-
pean market for commodities, in par-
ticular sugar from Fiji. The Fourth
Lomé Convention expired in February
2000. Since preferential trade access
runs counter to global free trade,
Lomé IV was allowed to continue only
because the World Trade Organization
granted a waiver, and critics feared it
would be replaced by something much
less favorable to the region.
The last major round of trade nego-
tiations among wto members was the
Uruguay Round, 1986–1993. The
next round, designed to further liber-
alize world trade, was due to begin at
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a wto meeting in the United States in
late 1999, and negotiators from both
developed and developing countries
duly met in Seattle at the end of
November. What then happened took
organizers and the Clinton Adminis-
tration by surprise. Huge demonstra-
tions of anti–World Trade Organiza-
tion activists occupied city intersec-
tions, brought central Seattle to a halt,
prevented delegates from reaching
meetings, and turned the meeting into
a fiasco. While demonstrators outside
shouted abuse, delegates inside from
Latin American, Caribbean, and Afri-
can countries threatened to walk out
unless the claims of developing coun-
tries were recognized. In the end, no
new trade round began.
The Battle of Seattle, as it came to
be called, dramatized the position of
poorer countries in a globalizing
world and influenced negotiations
over Lomé between the European
Union and the 71 acp states. Fresh
from Seattle, European ministers were
determined to show that, unlike the
United States, they appreciated the
developing world’s need for flexible
new arrangements. Within a week,
negotiators in Brussels had agreed on
post-Lomé arrangements more favor-
able to acp states than most people
expected, confirmed by a final agree-
ment reached in February 2000. The
ultimate wto goal of global free trade
and investment remains, but transi-
tional arrangements will give develop-
ing countries more time to adjust. The
two sides will ask the World Trade
Organization for a further waiver of
its free trade rules so that preferential
access can continue during a prepara-
tory period that will last until 2008.
By then, new arrangements will have
been negotiated, region by region, so
that all regions’ trade with the Euro-
pean Union will eventually become
wto compliant, but a review in 2006
will examine whether extra time is
needed (EU 1999). A separately nego-
tiated renewal of the sugar protocol
gives Fiji even longer to adjust. The
post-Lomé convention will be called
the Suva Convention and will be
signed in the Fijian capital in June
2000.
At the technological level, global-
ization means a revolution in commu-
nications, officially recognized by the
Palau Forum’s “Vision for the Pacific
Information Economy,” which looks
forward to a regional future in which
the Internet becomes widely available
to the people of the Pacific and busi-
ness uses it to “enhance the region’s
competitiveness in the global econ-
omy” (spf 1999). That future is far-
ther off, and communications issues
are more political than the Forum’s
motherhood statement suggests. Many
people in the region still have no elec-
tricity or telephone, far less access to
the Internet, and the globalization
agenda is driving the region toward
more competition in telecommunica-
tions. The shift is toward cheaper
telecommunications for those with
access, and away from government-
subsidized schemes to make access
widely available to national popula-
tions.
Progress was slow in continuing
negotiations over a tuna management
regime for the western and central
Pacific at the year’s two meetings of
the Multilateral High-Level Confer-
ence on Fisheries in Honolulu. In
accordance with article 64 of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea
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and the 1995 UN Implementing
Agreement on Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, the nations
with a stake in Pacific tuna fisheries
have been negotiating a tuna manage-
ment regime for a number of years;
they committed themselves in the
1997 Majuro Declaration to agree-
ment by mid-2000. The fishing
nations are the United States, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, China, the Philip-
pines, and Indonesia. On the other
side are all Pacific Island states and
territories, together with Australia,
New Zealand, and France. The Pacific
Island states’ main concern is that, in
agreeing to a regime that will govern
tuna wherever it is, they will surren-
der sovereign rights over tuna within
their exclusive economic zones. They
have therefore favored separate man-
agement regimes for their exclusive
economic zones, whereas the fishing
nations want a single regime within
those zones and on the high seas.
Negotiations in 1999 swung in favor
of the fishing nations on this and
other issues. A convention will likely
be adopted in September 2000,
together with an interim regime until
it comes into effect (Tarte 1999).
Ministers met in Suva for the
annual Forum Regional Security
Meeting, and the Forum itself called
for vigilance on matters such as cyber
crime and illegal immigration, but
their concerns paled beside those of
another country whose sufferings and
struggle for independence attracted
global and regional attention during
1999—East Timor. The Forum wel-
comed the establishment of interfet
(International Forces in East Timor),
the Australian-led multinational force
that intervened in the former Indone-
sian territory following the massacres
of September. An advance party of
Fiji military officers went to East
Timor in December to prepare for the
arrival of a Fiji contingent of 185 who
joined the subsequent UN peacekeep-
ing operation. On an earlier visit to
Fiji, Jose Ramos-Horta, the East Tim-
orese independence leader, said East
Timor should join the South Pacific
Forum, but no development in this
direction took place.
The Forum formally admitted New
Caledonia as an observer, following
political developments in the French
territory over the previous eighteen
months. The 1998 Noumea Accord
provided for “shared sovereignty,”
New Caledonian citizenship, an irre-
versible transfer of powers from
France to the territory over ten years,
and elections for new representative
institutions, including provincial
assemblies, a territorial congress, an
eleven-member executive, and a sen-
ate of customary chiefs. A referendum
on independence is now due sometime
between 2014 and 2018. The May
1999 elections, the first under the new
arrangements, gave the anti-indepen-
dence party, the rpcr, the largest
number of seats in the Congress but
denied it a majority, so it allied with 
a Kanak group, the Fédération des
Comités de Co-ordination des Indé-
pendantistes (fcci), a breakaway from
the traditional independence party,
the flnks. In this way the rpcr suc-
ceeded in maintaining its dominance
in Noumea and the Southern Province
and in the government as a whole,
though four of the eleven new minis-
ters were from the flnks. Under the
French constitution, New Caledonia
is no longer an overseas French terri-
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tory. It is an overseas French “coun-
try,” and Congress passed the first
“country law” in October (Maclellan
1999).
French Polynesia also headed down
the road of semi-decolonization in
1999 and will become an overseas
French “country.” Like New Caledo-
nia, French Polynesia will be granted
irreversible powers from Paris (on
matters such as labor, higher educa-
tion, municipalities, land tenure, and
the media), with key powers retained
by the French state, and its citizens
will be given a local citizenship that
can coexist with French citizenship.
Unlike New Caledonia, French Poly-
nesia has not been promised a refer-
endum on independence but, as a
“Pacific Island territory on a clear
path to achieving self-government or
independence,” it meets the Forum’s
observership criterion (spf 1999). All
in all, France succeeded in its some-
what sophistical exercise of keeping
New Caledonia and French Polynesia
as parts of France while conveying the
impression that their political status
has radically changed in the direction
of independence. 
Whether Bougainville is a case for
decolonization depends on one’s point
of view. Bougainville remained peace-
ful in 1999 while inching forward to
a new political status still to be deter-
mined. The Bougainville Transitional
Government ceased to exist as from
the end of 1998, and was replaced by
a nominated body called the Bougain-
ville Constituent Assembly. In May
Bougainvilleans voted in 69 electorates
for the Bougainville People’s Congress,
from which a 31-member Congres-
sional Executive Council emerged.
Joseph Kabui, the former Bougainville
Revolutionary Army leader who broke
with Francis Ona in 1997 to negotiate
peace, became president of the Con-
gress. These developments took place
against a background of the continu-
ing presence of the Peace Monitoring
Group, led by Australia, and growing
confidence in the peace process as pre-
viously hostile factions began to coop-
erate in a system of nonviolent politics.
The development that Bougainville
was denied for ten years was slowly
returning in the form of schools,
health care, freedom of mobility, and
opportunities to earn cash. Arawa
remained a neutral zone. By Decem-
ber negotiations between the Papua
New Guinea government and Bou-
gainvillean leaders had produced the
Hutjena Record, hailed by Kabui as 
a “breakthrough.” Under Hutjena,
Papua New Guinea agreed that “the
highest possible autonomy shall be
granted to Bougainville subject to
negotiations” and undertook to exam-
ine the issue of a binding Bougainvil-
lean referendum on independence 
(pir 1999c).
Yet the road to a permanent peace
in Bougainville remained tortuous. A
hardline position on independence
continued to be advanced by Francis
Ona, the self-styled president of the
Republic of Mekamui which in his
view has existed since declaring inde-
pendence in 1990. Ona continued to
enjoy support in some parts of central
and southern Bougainville. If things
do not go his way, Ona might still be
able to mobilize followers for a return
to war, or at least to acts of sabotage
and violence. Hundreds of Papua
New Guinean troops, though many
fewer than before, remained on the
island, symbols of the dominance of
Port Moresby. No decommissioning
of weapons was in prospect, and too
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many people had too many guns
(Regan 1999).
Most fundamentally, while some
leading Bougainvilleans continued to
believe they were on a path to inde-
pendence, the national government 
of Papua New Guinea showed no sign
of accepting such an outcome. There
was a danger that Bougainvillean
leaders were interpreting the Hutjena
Record as a charter of independence
while the national government saw it
quite differently. As the former prime
minister of Papua New Guinea, now
Mining and Bougainville Affairs min-
ister, Sir Michael Somare warned at
the end of the year, “The Constitution
of Papua New Guinea does not cur-
rently provide for a referendum. Suc-
cessive governments and leaders of all
major political parties and groups in
the National Parliament have repeat-
edly said that independence for Bou-
gainville is not an option. The present
government is prepared to look at the
issues raised by the Bougainville par-
ties. We are ready to consult and
cooperate with them in developing a
workable autonomy package within
the framework of the Papua New
Guinea Constitution” (pir 1999d).
In the wider political scene of
Papua New Guinea, a no-confidence
vote in the national parliament in July
brought a change of government wel-
comed by all who want political sta-
bility in that country. By a vote of 99
to 5, parliamentarians replaced Bill
Skate with Sir Mekere Morauta as
prime minister. Morauta told the PNG
people the facts and took hard deci-
sions. Papua New Guinea, he said,
was virtually bankrupt and faced huge
hurdles in corruption and a financial
crisis. He reestablished contacts with
the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, introduced a strin-
gent supplementary budget, promised
that 2000 would bring “the harshest
budget since independence,” and iden-
tified Air Niugini, Telekom, Post PNG,
the Electricity Commission, and the
National Broadcasting Corporation as
likely to be sold under a new privati-
zation scheme aimed at repaying inter-
national loans. By the new year the
kina had plunged to a new low of 31
cents against the US dollar, but Papua
New Guinea was at least in the hands
of leaders who understood the reali-
ties of its situation.
In the Pacific as in many parts of
the developing world, globalization
unites people at one level of society,
while issues of identity divide them at
another. Just as peace seemed estab-
lished in Bougainville, ethnic violence
erupted in Solomon Islands, when mil-
itants on Guadalcanal began to harass
and expel settlers who came from the
neighboring island of Malaita. The
trouble, which had been brewing for
months, erupted into a succession of
arson attacks, murders, and road-
blocks in the first half of the year,
aimed at driving Malaitan and other
non-Guadalcanal settlers from Gua-
dalcanal land. By June thousands of
refugees had poured into Honiara,
where the Red Cross and the govern-
ment struggled to find room for them
in public buildings. To relieve the
pressure in the national capital, the
government of Prime Minister Bar-
tholomew Ulufa‘alu (himself a Malai-
tan) shipped Malaitans back to their
home island and endeavored to reach
peace agreements with the Guadalca-
nal people, but the crisis was beyond
his ability to settle, and he eventually
declared a state of emergency.
A Commonwealth mission bro-
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kered a precarious peace in late June.
It was led by Major General Sitiveni
Rabuka as Special Envoy, fresh from
defeat in the Fiji elections and, as he
admitted, himself experienced in ille-
gal activity for a cause. With consid-
erable courage, Rabuka walked across
a bridge into the armed lines of the
Isatambu Freedom Fighters in order
to mediate a settlement. “We were
told there was no command struc-
ture,” Rabuka said later, “but the
group we met yesterday was very well
organized. There was a commander,
his 2ic, there were 215 young men,
most of them armed with shotguns
and .22 weapons. Telescopic sights,
binoculars, compasses. They are aware
of how to use these things” (afp 1999).
The Honiara Accord, as the peace
settlement was called, pointed to the
causes of tension: Malaitans had
squatted on land in Honiara, Malai-
tans predominated in government and
private-sector jobs, Guadalcanal peo-
ple wanted compensation for murders
committed by Malaitans, they resented
the influx of migrants, successive gov-
ernments had failed to respond to
their complaints, and so on.
The Honiara Accord was as much
a statement of intentions as an agree-
ment to make peace. It resolved, “All
organisations formed for the purpose
of pushing demands of the people of
Guadalcanal through the use of force
be dissolved with immediate effect.
All members of the group should
return home and surrender their
weapons” (pir 1999b). It called for
work to resume at the Gold Ridge
Mine, Solomon Islands Plantations
Limited, and elsewhere. And it sug-
gested that the Land and Titles Act be
reviewed, illegal occupation of land
be investigated, and squatting in Gua-
dalcanal be discouraged. Within six
weeks Rabuka had negotiated a sec-
ond peace accord, the Panatina Agree-
ment, in order to make the first one
work. Twenty police from Fiji and
Vanuatu arrived in the Solomons in
October to monitor progress, and the
peace was still holding as the year
ended. But tension in Guadalcanal
remained high, freedom of movement
outside Honiara was restricted, weap-
ons stayed in rebel hands, and a group
called the Malaita Eagles Force stole
rifles and a rocket launcher from a
police armory early in the new year.
Checkpoints on the outskirts of Honi-
ara symbolized the new situation.
The most extraordinary election of
the year took place in Fiji. The elec-
tion, held in May, was the first under
the 1997 Constitution and operated
under new rules. Of the nation’s 71
constituencies, 25 were “open,” that
is, open to candidates and voters with-
out regard to race, a practice common
to most liberal democracies but new
to Fiji. Voting was compulsory. And
the “alternative vote” replaced “first
past the post” as the voting system,
meaning the second, third, and subse-
quent preferences of voters could be
distributed to other candidates if their
first choice candidate was excluded
for lack of first preferences. In theory,
this system would ensure the election
of candidates least disliked by most
voters; in practice, the parties used it
to channel votes to allies in ways few
voters understood.
On one side of the political divide
stood a coalition put together by the
governing svt with the National Fed-
eration Party (nfp) and the small
United Generals Party. Rabuka the
Fijian (svt) and Reddy the Indo-Fijian
(nfp) were widely expected to win.
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They were, after all, the architects of
the 1997 Constitution and the makers
of a new multiracial Fiji. On the other
side was the People’s Coalition, a loose
grouping of the Fiji Labour Party, the
Party of National Unity, and the Fijian
Association Party. To universal sur-
prise, even that of Labour leader
Mahendra Chaudhary himself, the
People’s Coalition won a resounding
victory, with Labour’s 37 seats giving
it a parliamentary majority in its own
right. Chaudhary quickly claimed 
the prime ministership, the first 
Indo-Fijian to hold that office, and
appointed two Fijians—Tupeni Baba
and Adi Kuini Vuikaba Speed—as
deputy prime ministers. The Veitokani
ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito, a conserv-
ative Fijian grouping, joined the gov-
ernment, together with the Party of
National Unity and the Fijian Associ-
ation Party, leaving a tiny opposition
in the form of Rabuka’s once-mighty
svt, now reduced to a mere 8 seats.
Fiji’s President Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara played a crucial role in the tense
aftermath of the election, in reconcil-
ing disappointed Fijians to what many
saw as an Indian victory, though
Fijians persisted with moves to change
the constitution yet again. 
Rabuka lost for a number of rea-
sons, not all his fault. The 1998
drought hit farmers hard, and the east
Asian economic downturn compelled
Fiji to devalue its dollar in 1998,
forcing up prices. Economic reform,
embraced on the advice of aid donors,
led to restructuring and loss of jobs.
Infrastructure, especially the water
supply, had deteriorated in the
Rabuka years. In addition, many
Indo-Fijians could not understand
why Jai Ram Reddy allied himself
with Rabuka, the coup-maker who
had caused them so much insecurity.
They therefore removed Jai Ram
Reddy’s nfp, the oldest party in Fiji,
from parliament altogether and voted
in large numbers for the Labour
Party. While the Fijian vote splintered,
the Indo-Fijian vote consolidated,
delivering victory to Labour in all 19
Indian communal seats.
The Tongan election produced a
reverse for the pro-democracy move-
ment, which won 5 of the 9 seats for
the people’s representatives, fewer
than at any time since 1987 (the
nobles also have 9 seats and the King
appoints the remaining 12 parliamen-
tarians, who are all ministers). By one
measure, the vote for pro-democracy
candidates fell by 40 percent com-
pared with 1996. Yet as Ian Campbell
has argued, in a political system where
personal followings are important, the
result can be over-interpreted. In his
view, the movement for a democratic
Tonga continues to enjoy “substantial
popular support” and popular resent-
ment of high-level corruption remains
(Campbell 1999, 272).
Political corruption might have
been involved in the assassination 
of Sämoa’s minister of Public Works,
Luagalau Levaula Kamu, on 16 July.
Luagalau was attending the twentieth
anniversary celebrations of the ruling
Human Rights Protection Party in an
Apia hall when his cell phone rang.
He moved to a back room to answer
and was shot dead. The assassin was
sentenced to death by the Samoan
Supreme Court. His father, Leafa
Vitale, was charged both with the
murder and with inciting people to
kill Luagalau and the prime minister,
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi. The
father and a co-accused are former
cabinet ministers.
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At least in part, individuals make
the history of the Pacific Islands. The
year saw the deaths of Father Walter
Lini, who led Vanuatu to indepen-
dence in 1980 and was prime minister
until 1991, and of Tofilau Eti Alesana,
who led Sämoa through most of the
1980s and 1990s. Lourdes Pangeli-
nan, a Guamanian lawyer, became the
first woman leader of the Pacific Com-
munity. As noted earlier, Mahendra
Chaudhary became the first Fiji citi-
zen of Indian ancestry to become
prime minister, Mekere Morauta
replaced Bill Skate as Papua New
Guinea’s prime minister, and former
Fiji prime minister Sitiveni Rabuka
played a vital role as Commonwealth
Special Envoy to Solomon Islands.
The magazine Islands Business nomi-
nated Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, presi-
dent of Fiji, the “man of the century”
for his contributions to the region
over many years. 
Regionalism shapes the history of
the Pacific Islands, because regional
institutions play such an important
part in their development. If name-
changing is a measure of the vitality
of regional institutions, they are full
of life. The South Pacific Commission
became the Secretariat of the Pacific
Community in 1998. As from Octo-
ber 2000, the South Pacific Forum
will become the Pacific Islands Forum
in recognition of its membership
north of the equator. And in 1999 the
South Pacific Coordinating Commit-
tee (spocc) became the Council of
Regional Organizations in the Pacific
(crop).
stewart firth
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